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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
TIIIOKOL
IL\TIO~,

CHE~IICAL CORPOa corporation,
Plaintiff-Respondent and
Cross-Appellant

vs.

UXITED STATES OF AMERICA,
. "ff-I ntervenor an d
Plazntz
Cross-Appellant

l

Case No.

I

~

9912

vs.

LEGRANDE PETERSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT AND
CROSS-APPELLANT

STATE~IEXT

OF XATURE OF CASE

Respondent adopts the statement of the nature
of the case set out by appellant.
DISPOSITIOX IX LO,YER COURT
Respondent adopts the statement of the appellant
set out as the disposition in the lower court.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON CROSS APPEAL
The respondent and cross-appellant seeks to sustain that part of the court's decision which was favorable
to the relief sought and to have this court declare Section 59-13-73 U.C.A. 1953 invalid and unconstitutional,
for the reason that it is not uniform in application;
that it has not repealed, by implication or otherwise,
Section 59-2-2 U.C.A. 1953, which section grants special
tax rates to those who deal with the State of Utah under
a contract of sale which tax rates, in certain cases, are
as great as twenty times less than those applied to the
respondent and cross-appellant herein.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
For the reason that respondent cannot go along
with the statement set out by the appellant, it will now
set out its version of the statement of facts.
Thiokol Chemical Corporation is a Delaware Corporation, authorized to do business in the State of Utah,
and was conducting said business for the year 1961.
It came to Box Elder County because of the combined
efforts of many people who were seeking new industries.
It was in the year 1956 when it decided to locate in
Box Elder County. At that time Thiokol purchased
smne 11,000 acres of land and set up the plant facilities
in the interest of furthering its private business. Some·
time after it located here, it was able to obtain a con·
tract for the production of the first stage of the Minute·
2
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man and its operations immediately changed from a
few hundred employees to the point where it now has
approximately 6,000 employees. This situation has
changed the very complexities of the economy of the
northern part of Utah and has, at the same time brought
a demand on the public for many increased facilities
because of the increase in population by people moving
iu, with their families, to take part in this new industrial
revolution in our end of the state.
The taxing authorities, who were very dormant at
the time Thiokol 1noved into the State, immediately
took on new energy and as a result, a special session
of the Legislature in the year 1959 passed what is now
known as Section 59-13-73 U.C.A., 1953, as amended,
being a privilege tax upon the possession and use of
exempt property. By the passing of the above section
the Legislature aimed at picking up new revenue from
new industries that had been attracted to Utah by economic-minded people. It based such legislation on the
l\'lichigan statute which had previously been passed by
its legislature with the hope of obtaining revenue indirectly from the Government of the United States, by
taxing people who used the tax exempt property of the
l"'nited States to further their work on some particular
contract that they might have with it. The Utah Legis ..
lature, while following the Michigan statute, further
added to our statute, Section 59-13-73, U.C.A. 1953,
as amended, certain exemptions which read:
" . . . or where the possessor or user is a religious, educational or charitable organization or

3
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the proceeds of such use or possession inure to
the benefit of such religious, educational or charitable organization and not to the benefit of any
other individual association or corporation ... "
They also added a further provision as follows:
" ... No tax shall be imposed upon the possession or other beneficial use of public lands occupied under the terms of mineral or grazing leases
or permits issued by the United States or the
State of Utah or upon any easement unless the
lease, permit or easement entitles the lessee or
pennittee to exclusive possession of the premises
to which the lease, per1nit or easement relates."
These exemptions are in conflict with the exemptions of
our Constitution, which are found in Article 13, Section
2 and part of Section 3 of the same article. There was,
at the time this law was passed, another section on our
statutes which section is still the law and has been the
law since statehood, being Section 59-2-2 U.C.A. 1953,
which now reads as follows:
"59-2-2. State Lands - Improvements taxable.
- No tax shall be levied upon lands, the title to
which remains in the state, held or occupied by
any person under a contract of sale or lease from
the state, but this provision shall not be construed
to prevent the taxation of improvements on such
lands and an interest therein to the extent of
money paid, or due, in part payment of the pur·
chase price thereof, whether an extension or pay·
n1ent has been granted or not prior to the levy·
ing of such tax. 'Vhere final payment has been
made upon such lands, the contract of sale shall,
for the purpose of taxation, be regarded as pass·
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ing title to the purchaser or assignee, and the
state land board shall immediately certify the
receipt of such final payment to the state tax
commission.''

It is followed hy Section 59-2-3 U.C.A. 1953, setting
out a method of collecting the tax on this interest, which
is as follows:
"59-~-3. Collection of tax on interest of pur<.'haser - Certificate of sale - Effect of filed certificate. - Any tax levied on the interest of a
purchaser of state lands before title passes to
such purchaser or his assignee, shall be collected
in the same manner as taxes on personal property and the said interest shall be subject to sale
for taxes in the same manner as personal property.

"Upon the sale of any such interest, the officer
making such sale shall issue a certificate of sale,
and such certificate or a certified copy thereof,
upon being filed with the state land board, shall
operate as an assignment of the interest of the
original purchaser or his assignee in said contract to the purchaser at the tax sale."
There is also a provision of the statute which has also
been on our books since statehood and is Section 59-5-50
r.C.A. 1953. It was passed for the purpose of forwarding the equity of the purchaser in state lands sold under
contract to the proper officials so they, in turn, could
forward it to the respective county assessors. It reads
as follows:
"59-5-50. State lands - Land board to furnish
lists. - On or before the 15th day of January of
5
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each year the executive secretary of the state
land board must make out and transmit to the
state tax commission certified lists of lands sold
by the state for which certificates of purchase
or patents have been issued during the year preceding, giving a description thereof by divisions
or subdivisions or lots and blocks, together with
the names of the purchasers or patentees thereof,
and in the case of lands sold by the state upon
contract the amount of the purchase price and
the total amount paid or due on January 1, preceding.''
The substance of the next section of our statute has
been in existence since statehood and is still in existence
as Section 59-5-51 U.C.A. 1953, and reads as follows:
"59-5-51. Tax commission to furnish list of
patented lands to county assessors. - The state
tax commission shall furnish the several county
assessors, annually, by February 1, a list of all
patents of lands, except patents for mining locations, and all lands for which receivers' final
receipts have been issued for which patents have
not been issued, not previously reported, and a
certified list of all lands that have been sold by
·the state for which certificates of purchase or
patents have been issued during the year preced·
ing, giving a description thereof, together with
the names of the purchasers or patentees. Such
list shall also contain ·a description of the lands
sold by the state during the preceding year upon
contracts for purchase, together with the names
and addresses of the purchasers where known,
the amount of the purchase price and the total
amount paid or due thereon on January 1, pre·
ceding.''
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In the year 1961, Thiokol then had a contract with
the United States for the production of the first stage
of the ~linuteman. It had in its possession certain
personal property belonging to the United States of
America, which property was assessed to Thiokol, separately und apart from other property which was owned
outright hy Thiokol, under an assessment known as
D!l75 and on said assessment was levied a tax equal
to the sutn of $125,801.29 for said year. Said assessment
was made pursuant to Section 59-13-73, Utah Code
Annotated, 1953.
Thiokol, in dealing with the United States under
its contract (Exhibit #6) was working on a cost-plus
a fixed fee basis ( Rec. 74) . This contract is not a costplus a percentage of cost (Rec. 77). The fee is fixed
during the stage of negotiations and before any contract is awarded and particularly before any use of the
property is made ( Rec. 88) . Near the top of page 13
of Exhibit #6 it provides that the Government property to be furnished to Thiokol shall be used "primarily"
to carry out the contract (Rec. 79) (see dictionary definition for the word "primarily"). Mr. Boyce thought
the word "exclusively" should have been used (Rec.
79) but the testimony was to the effect (Rec. 73) that
Thiokol could not use any of the Government property
for non-government work. Also, that the Government,
in order to detern1ine the cost, must approve certain
policies of the company (Rec. 74, 75), all salary policies, job classifications, accounting policies, procurement policies, organizational structures, etc. The Gov7
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ernment had the right to remove any or part of the
personal property that might be sent to Thiokol to be
used on its project at any time, to any other project,
if it felt it might save some costs (Rec. 72) and this was
provided for in the contract.
Thiokol itself could not eliminate or reduce any
costs which were reimbursable, by any use of the machinery, that is, whether the machinery was used for a
part of the day or a full24 hours of the day, or whether
it was picked up and shipped elsewhere (Rec. 90) they
were still entitled to those costs expended to produce
the end result. The fee Thiokol was to receive for the
work would remain the same when the end result was
accomplished, the saving by the use of the Government
machinery which was furnished to Thiokol, was for the
benefit of the Government. If no machinery owned by
the Government was available, and one had to be obtained, then, under the contract, the Government would
authorize Thiokol to buy -it and title would go to the
United States immediately upon purchase and Thiokol
would be reimbursed.
Thiokol itself is a corporation set up for the purpose of making a profit ( Rec. 90, 246) but the use of
this Government owned personal property by it, to
carry out the contract, benefited the United States
only, not Thiokol, in that it reduced the Government's
costs. The United States was the only purchaser for
the sale of the product being produced. Thiokol itself
was not competing in any market, with any other firm
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or corporation. It had one job to do and that was the
first stage of the l\Iinuteman. The Government and
Thiokol had agreed on the fee to be paid for the work
in the production to be performed and in said agreement
it had provided it would pay the cost, on top of the
agreed fee. It also provided that the Government might
save itself some costs by furnishing to Thiokol certain
personal properties which it might have on inventory.
Thiokol was bound to use the same if humanly possible.
If the United States of America found it might benefH
itself economically by moving the machinery after it
had been shipped to Thiokol, to other places, it so re·
served the right to transfer the machinery immediately.
On November 29, 1961, Thiokol paid all of its taxes
for which it was responsible, on its own privately owned
lnnds, improvements and personal property. In addition thereto, Thiokol paid the sum of $125,801.29 for
the assessment made under Section 59-13-73 Utah Code
Annatated, 1953, and paid this last portion of the tax
under protest (Rec. 205) pursuant to directions from
its contractor. United States of America. On May 21,
1962, and within the period of limitations, Thiokol commenced this action ( Rec. 195) for a return of the money
and the lTnited States, who had directed the suit be
filed, intervened and challenged the constitutionality
of the tax clai1n and claimed an interest in the litigation
(Rec. :?14, 218). The Attorney General of the State
of l'"tah entered under Section 78-33-11, U.C.A. 1953 .
.A.t the trial of the issues before the First Judicial
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District Court sitting without a jury, certain witnesses
were brought before the court, one of which was Max
Gardner, Director of the Utah State Land Board. He
was shown Exhibit #3 (Rec. 53), which is a list of the
lands sold on contract by the State Land Board; to
the individuals or corporations, showing the equities of
the purchasers thereon. He was also shown a list of
re-sold land (Ex. 5) and (Rec. 54) and explained the
difference to be that those listed on Exhibit #3 were,
at the time of sale, lands that were still part of the
public domain, while those listed on Exhibit # 5 were
lands which had been acquired through mortgage foreclosure, or default, and were not part of the public
domain at the time title was obtained. He explained
(Rec. 57) what Exhibit IA covered, being a special
use lease to the Gilmer Lime Company, which had the
following provision in it:
"Lessee shall use the premises solely for the
installation of facilities necessary, convenient,
and incidental to the conduct of mining operations of lessee, including but not limited to spur
tracks, storage, crushing, cleaning and treatment
facilities, and shall not commit waste upon the
premises."
This lease of Gilmer Lime Company (Rec. 57) had
a grazing lease thereon, being #I32I4 issued to J. W.
Jordon of Heber, Utah, on the S.E. l)t of the section
and on the S.W.lJ± was a grazing lease #LI3215 issued
to L. W. Fitzgerald and Sons of Draper, Utah. He
told about a sp~cial use lease #II (Rec. 64, 65) which
contained this provision:
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"Lessee shall use the leased premises only for
the purpose of constructing and operating thereon an antique shop, a coffee shop,"
He told of leases, Exhibits 1G and 1H, (Rec. 65) and
said they were not mineral or grazing leases and none
of these leases referred to were assessed by any taxing
authority on the State of Utah.
~lr. ~lax

H. Kerr, a director for the Property Tax
Di,·ision of the State Tax Commission, claimed he had
general supervision over county assessors (Rec. 97)
and was produced as a witness for the defendant, who
claimed they have to conduct annual assessors schools
for instructions, which were generally held in December
of each year ( Rec. 99) . He claimed he instructed the
assessors in December of 1959, that the new privilege
tax law had been passed and they would have to apply it
(Rec. 99), but, for the purpose of showing that this
officer, who had such supervisory powers, did not consider it to apply to lands .sold on contract by the State
of Utah, we quote the following from cross-examination
(Rec. 105):
"Q. 'Veil, I understood you to say that. I'm
getting more specific. What instructions did
you give with respect to this particular factual situation: ~Ir. "X" buys some land from
the state under an installment contract. He
makes some installment payments, but he
receives no title to the property. The title
remains in the state, but Mr. "X" is engaged
in farn1ing and he farms this lands and he
n1akes a handsome profit from the farming

11
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of this land. Is he taxed with respect to his
use of the land under section 59-13-73?
A. I do not recall such a hypothetical case ever
coming to my attention to require an answer
or a specific instruction.
Q. Have you been aware of this litigation prior
to today?

A. This is my first day that I've been in court.
Q. No, I'm not asking you that. We haven't
tried this case .before today. Just started
this rn.orning. Have you been aware of the
pendency of this litigation?

A. Yes.
Q. Have you had occasion to consider whether,
in such circumstances as the hypothetical case
which I give you a mmnent ago, whether the
tax should or should not be assessed?

A. I don't think that I have specifically con·
sidered that hypothetical case before. This
is something that's.. new. When we have a
specific case presented to my division, we refer
it to the legal division for specific advice."
Again on page 107 of the Record we have:
"Q. And do they in the course of complying with
this requirement certify to you the equities
in state lands that they are assessing?

A. No, the counties do not certify that to the
Tax Comn1ission. The Tax Cmnmission is
required under the law to transmit to .t~e
county, the. County Assessors, the eqmtles
in state lands as furnished to the Tax Com·
tnission by the State Land Board.

12
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Q. And has the State Tax Commission given
thought to the need to assess these equities
under section 59-13-73?

.A. I don't remember any specific consideration
that I was a party to by the Tax Commissioners. referring to them as a commission, no.
Q. Such instructions have never been issued?

.A. So far as I know the only thing that has happened since the imposition of this law as
regard to state land equities have been the
same as before. We have been certifying
them to the County Assessors in accordance
with the law that requires us to. I don't know
the citation.
Q. 59-2-2?

.A. If that is the one. That's the one we have been
following.
Q. In other words, there has been no change in
the taxation of the interest which a contract
vendee has in state lands since the advent of
59-13-73?

A. I can't answer that. I can only say that the
equity information as to the purchase price,
the purchaser, and the description of the land
and the equity as of January first has been
transmitted to the County Assessors in the
same after that date as it was before ... "
And on page 108, we have:
"Q. Does the State Tax Commission have the
authority to direct County Assessors to assess
property which they have overlooked when
it comes to the attention of the State Tax
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Commission that the properties have been
omitted from the tax rolls?
A. It is my understanding that the Tax Commission has the authority, after the Board of
Equalization has met, to review the work of
the County Assessors and to assess in its own
name this property.
Q. Any property that was omitted?

A. Yes.
Q. Has the State Tax Commission, in the exer·

cise of that authority, ever made any assess·
ments under section 59-13-73 for the year
1961?

A. Not to my knowledge."
He was asked if there were investigations being made
by the Tax Commission to determine if any property
was escaping taxation under Title 59-13-73 (Rec. Ill)
and he replied that there was a man in the field for 18
months with specific assignment to investigate property
escaping taxation. He admitted that this man had been
in Box Elder County (Rec. Ill) but he could not
recall anything being added to the rolls on account of
this Section 59-13-73, and the court made a very interesting comment at the close of his testimony (Rec.
116):

"THE COURT: Are you going to be here
tomorrow, 1\'Ir. Kerr? The court is rather inter·
ested in finding out what instructions were given
the assessors "in 1959.
l\1R. BOYCE: I think we have another wit·
ness which will also corroborate that and go into
more detail.

14
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

THE COURT: In other words, we're getting
an issue now as to whether the state just used
this as a fifth wheel to get taxes where they
weren't otherwise assessed or whether you gave
a blanket order that the act was to be enforced
against everybody."
~lr. John Rackman, another witness for the de-

fendant, stated he was director of the evaluation division of the State Tax Commission (Rec. 118) and had
the responsibility, under the provisions of 59-13-73,
to make discovery and inform the county assessors of
their duties (Rec. 120) and that he had a staff of 27
people. He was asked a hypothetical question ( Rec.
1~7) to the effect that if a man were buying a piece
of property from the State on contract for $10,000.00
and had paid $2,000.00 on an installment plan toward
the purchase price, whether the land would be taxed on
the basis of the $2,000.00 paid for the value of the land
and he said, if the assessor were assessing under 59-2-2
it would be on the $2,000.00. He was asked if the Tax
Commission had issued any instructions if this land were
being used for business for profit whether the assessment
would be under 59-2-2 or under 59-13-73. After a considerable amount of hedging, on page 128, and upon
cross-examination, he was asked:
"Q. I'm sure you do. And yet in your capacity
and with all of the dedication that you bring
to bear upon your job and the performance
of your duties, you've never heard of any
direction by the State Tax Commission to
assessors to value land held under contract
fron1 the state under 59-13-73 rather than
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under 59-2-2 where the contract vendee is
using that land in connection with a business
operated for profit, have you?
A. I haven't heard of it?"
After further evasive answers on cross-examination,
(Rec. 129) he was asked if he hadn't signed a letter
dated December 26, 1962, with one Norman Johnson,
one of the Assistant Attorney Generals, in regard to
this very problem. He admitted he had done so and he
was then asked (Rec. 129) bottom of the page:
"Q. So that this question of whether state lands
under contract, where the lands are being
used by the contract vendee in connection
with a business operated for profit, has been
before you at least since November 27, and
isn't it reasonable to assume that in your con·
sideration of this problem you would have
uncovered and would have been made aware
of and would have found any directive that
might have at any time up .~ntil today been
issued by the State Tax Commission to Coun·
ty Assessors as to what procedure to follow
in such situations?

A. Well, I don't know whether I'm supposed to
testify as to my abilities as a research man
or to the degree of research that I put into
the particular problem, but I don't know of
any directive that has been issued by the Tax
Commission."
lie was asked (Rec. 132) where title to the property
is in the name of the State and an individual has con·
tracted to buy this property in connection with a busi·
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ness operated for profit, is that land taxed to the user,
the one who has contracted to buy it from the State,
under Section 59-13-73, or under Section 59-2-2, and
his answer was 59-2-2.
He was shown Exhibit #3 (Rec. 133) which was
a list of the State owned lands being sold under contract. l-Ie appeared to be perfectly familiar with it and
said it was to indicate to the assessor that there is a
property interest in a particular property that should
be assessed. He was asked if these equities were still
being sent out to the assessors in the same way now
ns prior to the enactment of 59-13-73, and he answered:
Yes. He was asked (Rec. 134) if there would be any
other purpose for reporting the equities except to indicate to the assessor on what the tax is to be based
and his answer was, that it was still being sent for the
sume reason it was sent in 1958. He came up with a
new theory ( Rec. 135) and he was asked if there were
any reason for sending out the equity listing, if Section
59-13-73 is applicable and his answer was:

"A. I've thought about that. It's possible, of
course, that you would tax the equity under
the basis or on the basis of 59-2-2 if that law
were to remain upon the books, and possib~
the balance could be taxed on the basis of the
privilege tax."
On re-direct examination by J.\;lr. Boyce, Mr. Boyce
readily fell in with this suggestion of Mr. Rackham.
Then on page 136 he said:
"Q. X ow could it not be possible, Mr. Rackham,
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that some lands which the state sells to a particular individual may be taxable under 59·
13-73 and that sum 1nay be taxable under
59-2-2, depending on the use, the nature of
their occupation, and things of that nature?
A. \Vell, I would assume so."
I have tried to set our very carefully the testimony
of these two individuals who claim to be officers of the
State of Utah and particularly the Tax Commission,
charged with the responsibility of carrying out the en·
forcement of the new privilege tax law, to show that
they did not consider in the least degree that 59-2-2 had
been repealed by any enactment of 59-13-73, either in
their own mind or by any deed that they had done to
so show their desire to have State lands assessed under
59-13-73.

Fred L. Petersen, the County Assessor of Box
Elder County, was placed on the stand. He was shown
Exhibit #8 (Rec. 140) and he advised us that he knew
what it was and that it was the equities in state lands
paid on the purchase price that pertained to Box Elder
County. He admitted he had received it from the Tax
Commission and had received one also for the year 1963.
He showed certain figures on Exhibit #8 (Rec. 141)
which he had applied to the equity which had been paid
in by the purchaser, not to the value of the land but
for the purpose of making the assessment. Again on
(Rec. 142) and on (Rec. 144) he gave an account of
how it was applied and taxed. He admitted (Rec. 158)
that all land owned by the State of Utah and which
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was purchased under contract was only assessed in Box
Elder County for just the equity and that (Rec. 159)
it was assessed in 1961 just as the same as it had been
done in the past. He admitted he had made no investigation of any property that might be owned by the
county or the City or the Board of Education, which
hus been leased to individuals (Rec. 160). He admitted
(Rec. 177) that there was a gravel pit some people
hy the name of Parson were buying from Brigham
City and he even had correspondence with the State
'l'ax Commission on it and yet it was not assessed for
the year 1961 (Rec. 179).
Exhibit #I, which was read into the record (Rec.
2 to 6) was received and defendant's counsel (Rec. 6)

said:
"'Ve have no objections."
This exhibit shows there were more than 380 contracts
entered into with certain individuals for the sale of
lands by the State of Utah. Exhibits 3 and 5 are a list
of these lands and from an examination of them it was
readily discernable that some of the contracts involve
many hundreds of acres.
It was the contention of the defendant that Section
.59-13-73, being a privilege tax statute, had a provision
in the fifth line thereof, which reads:
" ... when such property is used in connection
with a business conducted for profit ... "
which should require the plaintiff to prove in his case,
that in every instance of any piece of land that might
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be owned by some entity such as the State, the Board
of Education, Brigham City or Box Elder County,
where the same was leased or being purchased, that
the plaintiff would have to prove the use of the land
was in connection with the business conducted for a
profit. (See various refusals to so stipulate as to the
use of the property for profit, Rec. 22, 23, 25, 27 and
31, and the court's statement, Rec. 32). As a conse·
quence, the parties attempted to resolve these diffi·
culties by entering into certain stipulations they made
into the record (Rec. 183-189), the substance of which
was, that Walter G. Mann would prepare an affidavit
as to the use of certain lands sold under contract by
the State of Utah in Box Elder County, which were
within his knowledge, as and for the year 1961. That
Mr. Mark Crystal, an employee in the State Land
Office, would prepare a statement regarding Exhibits
IA through IX. Also that Mr. Crystal and Lee Young,
employees of the State Land Board, would prepare
affidavits as to the use of land purchased on contract
from the State of Utah, as applied to the 380 different
contracts which were listed and sent to the assessors
and those affidavits would be received as exhibits as
to the use made of the particular lands they describe
in their affidavits. As to the balance, where any affidavit
failed to set out and cover any particular contract of
sale and show its used 1nade by the purchaser on the
balance of the 380 contracts, that the court would say
that the plaintiff has not sustained burden of proof in
regard to those contracts not covered. In other words,
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tht· mutter was before the court but that the plaintiff
hasn't ofl'ered suft'icient proof as required by the court,
as to any properties not covered by affidavits. These
affidavits of the four parties were obtained. Affidavits
on lund sold under contract by the State of Utah covered
npproxiinately 200 contracts which set out that the
purchaser was using the lands in a business conducted
t'or profit.
In summary, the evidence before the court showed
plainly that the only party in Box Elder County,
asst'Ss<'d under Section 59-13-73, was Thiokol Chemical
Corporation, for the year 1961. Also, that no contract
vendees fron1 the State of Utah, in Box Elder County,
or the entire State of Utah, were assessed under the
provisions of Section 59-13-73, but were, in fact, still
assessed under 59-2-2, Utah Code Annotated, 1953.
That no properties belonging to the Board of Education of Box Elder County School District, of the City
of Brighan1, or any other public body, were assessed
under Section 59-13-73, where there was a leasing or
a sale. That the State Tax Commission, or any other
public body. or official, did not consider by their actions
or practice that Section 59-13-73 was applicable to any
contract or lease by the State of Utah; that Section
,j!l-:?-:? was still in effect. That the Tax Commission
'
the County Assessors, and all other parties involved
were still operating as fully under Section 59-2-2,
C.C.A. 1953, for the year 1961, as they have been in any
other year since statehood.
n'ry
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THIOKOL CHEMICAL CORPORATION
WAS NOT TAXABLE UNDER SECTION 5913-73 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953. THE
SAME WAS IN CONFLICT WITH SECTION
59-2-2 UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 1953 AND
W.A.S UNCONSTITUTIONAL, VOID AND OF
NO EFFECT.
Under the stipulation Ex. #1, Thiokol Chemical
Corporation was assessed on 40lfo of its fair cash value
as of January 1, 1961, and the equity of those purchasing lands from the State of Utah was assessed on 407o
on their equity of the purchase price paid in as of J anuary 1, 1961. Let us give an illustration to show the
difference between these two: Suppose that a piece of
equipment which was owned by the United States had
a fair cash value of $2,000.00 on January 1st, 1961,
and suppose by the same token a person was buying
from the State of Utah a piece of land on contract
for $2,000.00 and had paid in the sum of $100.00. The
equity of $100.00 as compared with the value of the
other $2,000.00 is as much as 20 times difference. The
assessor applies his percentage as set out by statute,
which is 40lfo to the value on the one hand and the equity
on the other (59-5-1 Utah Code Annotated 1953), the
ratio of assessment is still the same, 20 times difference.
Consequently it is a fact that cannot be disputed, Sec·
tion 59-13-73 has imposed upon Thiokol Chemical Cor·
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poration and the Government of the United States a
burdc11 that is many tin1es greater than it is putting
on people dealing with the State of Utah under Section .>~1-:!-:! of the U.C.A. 1953. If a lesser burden has
btl'll imposed on users or purchasers of State owned
land-. than on users of lands owned by the Federal Govl'l'llllll'nt, is the assesstnent resulting therefrom unconstitutional and void?
"Section 59-5-l. Rate of assessment of propc:rty: - .AJl taxable property must be assessed at
forty percent of its reasonable fair cash value.
Land anrl the itnprovements thereon must be
separately assessed."

I.

\'!..

"Art. XIII. Sec. 2. Tangible property to be
taxed - Value ascertained - Properties exempt
- Legislature to provide annual tax for state .
.All tangible property in the state, not exempt
under the laws of the United States, or under
this constitution, shall be taxed in proportion to
its ,·alue, to be ascertained as provided by law.
The property of the state, counties, cities, towns,
sehool districts, municipal corporations and public libraries, lots tcith the buildings thereon used
c.rclush.'clp for either religious worship or charitable purposes, and places of burial not held or
used for private or corporate benefit, shall be
c,l'empt for taxation . . . ""(Emphasis added)..

··section 3. Assessment and Taxation of tangible property - Exen1ptions - Personal income
tax - disposition of revenues.
The Legislature shall provide by lRw a uniform and equal rate of assessment and taxation
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on all tangible property in t~~ State, according
to its value in money, and shall prescribe by law
such regulations as shall secure a just valuation
for taxation of such property, so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in propor·
tion to the value of his, her or its tangible prop·
erty, ... "
The next question is: Has the State of Utah,
through its Legislature, enacted by law a uniform and
equal rate of assessment and t~xation of all tangible
property in the state? Section 59-13-73 authorized an
assessment upon the value of the property while Sec·
tion 59-2-2 covering those people who are dealing with
the State of Utah, authorizes an assessment based on
the equity of the purchaser which may be as much as
20 times lower.

CASES
Here are two interesting federal cases which I wish
to analyze. The first is a case entitled Phillips Chemical
vs. Dumas Independent School District, found in 361
U.S., page 376, which is an appeal from the Supreme
Court of Texas, decision given February 23, 1960.
Under the laws of the State of Texas, and particularly
Article 5248, of the Revised Civil Statutes of Texas,
as amended 1950, which had application to taxation of
private users of property belonging to the United
States, there was a certain assessment made against the
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defendant. In addition to this particular article there
was also Article 7173, which governs the taxation of
private lessees of real property owned by the state and
its political subdivisions. It did not authorize taxation
of a lessee under a lease subject to termination at the
lessor's option in the event of sale. This Article #7173
is set out in part on page 379, and reads as follows:
"Property held under a lease for a term of
three years or n1ore, or held under a contract
for the purchase thereof, belonging to this state,
or that is exempt by law from taxation in the
hands of the owner thereof, shall be considered
for all the purposes of taxation, as the property
of the person so holding the same, except as
otherwise specifically provided by law."
The other section, being Article 5248 and set out in part
on page 378, and provides as follows:
''Provided further, that any portion of said
land and improvements, which is used and occupied by any person, firm, association of persons
or corporation, in its private capacity, or which
is being used or occupied in the conduct of any
private business or enterprise, shall be subject
to taxation by this state and its political subdivisions."
This last provision was added to the old law of Texas
and was intended to levy a tax upon the use of Government land held and occupied by tenants for profit.
There is another interesting sidelight in this case and
that is, that Phillips Chemical Company engages in a
commercial n1anufacture of ammonia on valuable in25
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dustrial property .leased fro~ the Federal Government
in Moore County, Texas. The lease, executed in 1948,
pursuant to the Military Leasing Act of 1947, 61 Stat.
77 4, is for a primary term of 15 years and calls for an
annual rental of over $1,000,000.00. However, it re·
serves to the Governn1ent the right to terminate upon 30
days' notice in the event of a national emergency and
up on 90 days' notice in the event of a sales of the
property. Consequently in this case, the state of Texas
could, if it had chosen, said this property was not subject to taxation as provided for under Article 7173
for the reason that the term was for a period of less
than three years, inasmuch as it could be terminated
on 30 days' notice under a national emergency, but
rather than do this they chose to assess it under Article
5248, which provided that the entire lease was subject
to an assessment. Stating it another way, they have
two statutes which were in conflict. We have a notation
found on page 380, which reads as follows:
"As construed by the Texas Courts, Article
7173 is less burdensome than Article 5248 in

three respects. First, the measure of a tax under
Article 7173 is not the full value of leased tax·
exempt premises, as it apparently is under Arti·
cle 5248 but only the price the taxable leasehold
would bring at a fair voluntary sale for cash:the value of the leasehold itself. Second, by Its
very terms Article 7173 imposes no tax on a
lessee whose lease is for a term of less than three
years. Finally, and crucially here, a leas~ ~or
three years or longer but subject-like P~11lhps
- to termination at the lessor's option m the
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event of a sale is not "a lease for a term of three
vears or more" for the purpose of Article 7173.
;rrammell vs. Faught, 74 Texas 557, 12 S.,V.
317. Therefore because of the termination provisions in its lease, Phillips could not be taxed
under Article 7173.
"Although .Article 7173 is, in terms, applicable
to all lessees who hold tax-exempt property under
a lease for a term of three years or 1nore, it ap~
pears that only lessees of public property fall
within this class in Texas. Tax .exemptions for
real property owned by private organizations
-charities, churches and similar entities-do not
survive a lease to a business lessee. The full value
of the leased property becomes taxable to the
owner and the lessee's indirect burden consequently is as heavy as a burden imposed directly
on federal lessees under Article 5248. Under
these circumstances, there appears to be no discrimination between the Government's lessees
and lessees of private property.
"However, all lessees of exempt public lands
would appear to belong to the class defined by
Article 7173. In view of the fact that lessees in
this class are taxed because they use exempt property for a non-exempt purpose, they appear to be
similarly situate and presumably should be taxed
alike. Yet by the amendment of Article 5248,
the Texas Legislature segregated federal lessees
and imposed on them a heavier tax burden than
is imposed upon the other members of the class
under Article 7173. In this case the resulting
difference in tax, .attendant upon the identity of
Phillip's lessor, is extreme; the state and the
school district concede that Phillips would not be
taxed at all if its lessor were the state or one of
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its political subdivisions instead of the Federal
Government. The discrimination against the
United States and its lessees seems apparent.
The question, however, is whether it can be jus·
tified."
This case was decided on February 23, 1960, and is a
very recent case on the subject matter and the case
goes into all of the other opinions rendered on the sub·
ject matter and shows the difference in their application
and then it says, on page 387:
"None of these arguments, urged in support
of the Texas classification, seem adequate to jus·
tify what appears to be so substantial and trans·
parent a discrimination against the Government
and its lessees. Here, Phillips is tax~d under
Article 5248 on the full value of the real property
which it leases from the Federal Government,
while businesses with similar leases, using exempt
property owned by the state and its political
subdivisions, are not taxed on their leaseholds at
all. The differences between the two classes,
at least when the Government's interests are
weighed in the balance, seems too impalpable to
warrant such a gross differentiation. It follows
that Article 5248, as applied in this case, dis·
criminates unconstitutionally against the United
States and its lessees. As we had occasion to
state quite recei1tly, it still remains true, as it has
from the time of McCullough vs. lVIaryland 43
Wheat, 316, that a state tax may not discrimi·
nate against the Government or those with whom
it deals. 3 US vs. City of Detroit, supra, at 4i3.
Therefore, this tax may not be exacted. Re·
versed.

i
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Another case, 1\Ioses Lake Homes vs. Grant County,
365 U.S. 744, I believe is in point. It came about when

the statutes of the State of Washington provided for
methods of assessment on Government leased property
at a much higher value and consequently at a much
higher tax than other taxable property. The code provided for an assessment of 50Cf'o of its fair market value
on other property, while it provided that "taxable leasehold estate shall be valued at such price as they would
bring at a fair, voluntary sale for cash." (Page 749).
The court, on page 751, said:
"If anything is settled in the law, it is that a
state may not discriminate against the Federal
Government, or its lessees. See e.g. Phillips Co.
vs. Dumas School District, 361 U.S. 376; United
States vs. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466, 473;
City of Detroit vs. Murray Corp., 355 U.S. 489.
In United States vs. City of Detroit, supra, we
said: 'It still remains true, as it has from the beginning, that a tax may be invalid even though
it does not fall directly on the United States if
it operates so as to discriminate against the Government of those with whom it deals'. 355 U.S.
at 473.
"The Dumas Case, supra, is closely in point
and controlling. There the state of Texas taxed
the leasehold estate of a government lessee at
the 'full value of the leased premises' (361 U.S.
at 378}, while it imposed a 'distinctly lesser burden on sin:tilarly situated lessees of exempt
property owned. by the State and its political
subdivisions.' 361 U.S. at 379. We there said,
'It does not seem too much to require that the
State treat those who deal with the Government
29
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as well as it treats those with whom it deals itself.' 361 U.S. at 385, and we held the tax to be
void because it 'discriminates unconstitutionally
against the United States and its lessees.' 361
U.S. at 379. That case is indistinguishable from
this one on the point here.
"The Court of appeals was also in error in
holding that 'the fact that the taxes are higher
does not invalidate the entire tax (but) only
requires that the amount collectible be reduced
to what it would have been if the tax had been
levied on a non-Wherry Act leasehold basis'
(276 F2d, at 847) and in remanding the case
to the District Court to make the necessary
adjustment. We held in the Dumas case, supra,
that a discriminatory tax is void and 'may not
be exacted', 361 U.S. at 387. The effect of court's
remand was to direct the District Court to decree a valid tax for the invalid one which the
State had attempted to exact. The District
Court has no power so to decree. Federal courts
may not assess or levy taxes. Only the appropriate taxing officials of Grant County may
assess and levy taxes on these leaseholds, and
the federal courts may determine, within their
jurisdiction, only whether the tax levied by those
offiicals is or is not a valid one. When, as here,
the tax is invalid, it 'may not be exacted.' Phillips
Co. vs. Dumas School District, 361 U.S. at 387."
The court, in concluding its remarks on this case, said
on page 752:
"Inasmuch as the taxes, presently assessed ~nd
levied, discriminate unconstitutionally aga1~st
the United States and its lessees, they are vmd,
and hence 1nay not be exacted. REVERSED."
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POINT IB
TliiOKOL DID XOT 1-IA\~E THE BENEFll'L\L USE REQUISITE FOR TAXATION
l' ~ D~~H s l~:cTI 0~ 59-1:3-73.
Plaintiff's do not dispute that under certain circumstances the use of Government property may be taxed
to the user, rather, they contend that such circumstances
did not exist here, and, if construed to be applicable
under the facts here present, Section 59-13-73 is unconstitutional.

In United States and duPont vs. Livingston, 179
F. Supp. 9, aff'd without opinion 364 U.S. 281, the
South Carolina Tax Commission "contend (ed) that
duPont had a separable beneficial and taxable use of
(Government property) for their use was necessary
to duPont's performance of its contractual obligations"
with the Government. (179 F.Supp. 9, 22). In rejecting
that contention, the Court said (179 F.Supp. 9, 23):
"For the possessor of. government property to
have a separable taxable use measured by the
,·alue of the Government property much more is
required than would be provided by complete
acceptance of the Tax Commission's hypothesis.
··The custodian of a federal post office build.
ing is paid for the performance of his duties,

but his use of the materials he requires in the
perforn1ance of his housekeeping duties is so
completely that of the United States that no one
would think of taxing him upon the value of the
materials. In each of the Detroit cases, the Supreme Court was concerned with taxation of a
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completely separate business enterprise which
used government property for its purposes of
profit and which derived as much advantage from
the use as if it had legal title to the property.
No such condition is to be found here. The use
of the Savannah River Plant and of goods and
materials purchased for its operation is so completely that of the United States, that while one
may concede the possibility of advantage to
others, those others do not become subject to
taxation upon the value of the plant or its pur·
chases when, by contract, and in good conscience
without a contract, the United States must pay
any tax enacted."
Like duPont, Thiokol did not pay any rent or other
charge for the use of any of the property, nor did it
use any of the property for any purpose other than the
fulfillment of its contracts with the Government. i\iore·
over, it held and used the property only at the will of
the Government, which had the absolute right to remove
any of the property at any time, if its interests would
be served thereby. Thus, like duPont, Thiokol was
nothing more than a bailee for the Government's benefit.
Unlike the contractors in the Detroit cases referred
to in Livingston, supra, Thiokol was not engaged in
merely manufacturing required items according to Gov·
ernment specifications. Rather, like duPont, Thiokol
was engaged in developing and testing.
Just as duPont, in Livington, was the alter ego
through which the Atomic Energy Commission dis·
charged its duty of furthering, by research and de·
velopment, the production of fissionable materials, so
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here. Thiokol Inay be considered the alter ego through
which the Air Force Department discharged its duty
or furthering the Government's missile program.
In sustaining the taxes in the Detroit cases, the
Supreme Court found that one contractor was "using
tax-exempt property for its own 'beneficial personal
use' and 'advantage' " {355 U.S. 466, 472); that
another was "free within broad limits to use the property as it thought advantageous and convenient in per1 Corming its contracts and maximizing its profits from
them" (355 U.S. 484, 486); and that the third was
"using or processing (Government property) in the
course of its own business" {355 U.S. 489, 493). Since
1
, no such findings are warranted here, Thiokol did not
. have the separable taxable use necessary to constitutionally sustain a tax under Section 59-13-73.
I

It is not only to avoid an unconstitutional construe·. tion of Section 59-13-73 that it must be held that Thiokol lacked the beneficial use requisite for taxation,
thereunder. Here, as in 1\tlichigan, the Legislature
apparently was trying to equate the tax burden imposed on private enterprise using exempt property
with that carried by similar businesses using taxed
property. In the absence of such equalization the lessees
of tax-exempt property might well be given a distinct
.economic preference over their neighboring competitors
Such consideration, however, does not obtain here.
Because of the very nature of the program in which it
,is engaged-development of missiles for the Govern1
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ment-there cannot possibly be any neighboring competitors over whom Thiokol can gain any advantage
by reason of its use of the property.
In sum, neither the purpose nor language of Section 59-13-73 require that Thiokol's use be held taxable
hereunder; and to avoid any question of its constitutionality Section 59-13-73 should be construed to be
inapplicable to Thiokol's use of the property. here involved. Moreover, if construed to be applicable here,
the tax provideu for by Section 59-13-73 is unconstitutional not only because it is tantamount to a tax on
the Government's property and activities (United
States and duPont vs. Livingston, supra; see also
United States v. Allegheny, 322 U.S. 174) but also
because it discriminates against the Government and
those with whom it deals.

POINT II
THE SUBJECT'S ASSESSMENTS DO IX·
FRINGE UP 0 N FEDERAL IMMUNITY
FRO~I STATE TAXATION, and,

POINT III
SECTION 59-13-73 UTAH CODE ANNO·
TATED, 1953, IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS
BEING IN VIOLATION OF BOTH THE FED· •
ERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTION.
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I fed that Points II and II are so closely related
that they can be covered together in the following argument.
As pointed out in Phillips Chemical vs. Dumas
Independent School District, 361 U.S. page 376, and
particularly the last paragraph found on page 387:
"As we had occasion to state, quite recently,
it still remains true, as it has from the time of
~lcCullough vs. Maryland, 43 Wheat, 316, that
·a state tax may not discriminate against the Government or those with whom it deals. 3 U.S.
vs. City of Detroit, supra, 473. Therefore, this
tax may not be exacted. Reversed."
Also, as pointed out in Moses Lake Homes vs. Grant
County, 365 U.S. 7 44, where quoted from page 751:
"If anything is settled in the law, it is that a
state may not discriminate against the Federal
Government, or its lessees ... It still remains
true, as it has from the beginning, that a tax
may be invalid even though it does not fall directly on the United States if it operates so as
to discriminate against the Government, or those
with whom it deals .... It does not seem too
much to l'equire that the state treat those who
deal with the government as well as it treats
those with whom it deals itself.... And we held
the tax to be void because it discriminates unconstitutionally against the United States and
its lessee."

.The U.S. Court having held that discrimination cannot
-:take place. let us examine closely the wording of Sec·.)ion 59-13-73 as compared to the limitations placed
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upon it by the State Constitution, to see if discrimination has taken place. Article 13, Section 2, begins as
follows:
"Tangible property to be taxed - Value ascertained - Properties exempt - Legislature to
provide annual tax for state: - All tangible
property in the state, not exempt under the laws
of the United States, or under this constitution,
shall be taxed in proportion to its value, to be
ascertained as provided by law. The property
of the state, counties, cities, towns, school districts, municipal corporations and public libra·
ries, lots with the buildings thereon used exclusively for either religious worship or charitable
purposes, and places of burial not held or used
for private or corporate benefit, shall be exempt
from taxation . .. n (Emphasis added).
In other words, the Constitution prescribes the exemp·
tion that shall be given to either religious or charitable
organizations, and limited it to lots with buildings
thereon. Let us compare that with our Section 59-13-73,
which reads:
"Section 59-13-73: Privilege tax upon pos·
session and use of tax-exempt property - Ex·
ceptions: - From and after the effective date
of this act there is imposed and there shall be
collected a tax upon the possession or other
beneficial use enjoyed by any private individual,
association, or corporation of any property, real
or personal, which for any reason is exempt from
taxation, when such property is used in connec·
tion with a business conducted for profit, except
where the use is by way of a concession in ~r
relative to the use of a public airport, park, fa1r·

1
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ground, or similar property which is available
us u mutter of right to the use of the general
public, or where the possessor or user is a religious, educational or charitable organization or
the proceeds of sztch 'USe or possession in,ure to
the benefit of such religi01ts, educational or charitable organization and not to the benefit of any
other indiridztal association or corporation ... ''
(Emphasis added).
Let us use several examples and see how this can be
ridiculously applied. Any church, charity or school
could lease from the State of Utah or from the Gov,ernment. buildings, lands or personal property and
enter into a competitive business at any place within
the State of Utah and so long as they were the users,
or the profits derived therefrom, were used for the bene~fit of either of these three organizations there would be
..no tax applied, or, if Thiokol were -developing or test-ing x-ray ma~hines or other equipment for a charitable
'~hospital, and using property owned by the charity in
performing its service contract, it would not be subject
Jnder Section 59-13-73, nor would it be subject thereto
:r, in executing a commission to design and fabricate
!~ligious objects for a church, it used as models for the
. ncorporation into the new work, objects or precious
netals loaned and furni~hed by the church. Nor would
rhiokol be taxed under Section 59-13-73 for the use
t would necessarily make of an educational institution's
a,roperty in performing a contract or redesigning an
.xisting laboratory computor or other facilities or
~quipment owned by the institution. Thus Section 591
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13-73 gives more favored treatment to religious, chari·

table and educational institutions than to the Govern·
ment, and contrary to its State Constitution.
Or, if any of these three organizations would lease
from the United States or the State of Utah, ware·
houses and then sublease them at a handsome profit to
private individuals to use in a competitive business
so long as they used the profit to benefit the charity,
the church or the school, they would not be taxed. Yet,
the Constitution has specifically limited the exemption
to be given to charitable and religious organizations,
to lots with buildings thereon, used for either religious
or charitable purpose. This court has held, in Parker
et al vs. Quinn, 64 P. 461, where Section 3 of Article
13 of the Constitution was discussed, that only that
portion of the property of a benevolent society which
is occupied and used exclusively for charitable pur·
poses, is exempt from taxation, and the exemption
does not extend to that portion not appropriated by
the society to its own use, but held as a source of reve·
nue. But Section 59-13-73 defies, and is in direct
opposition to, such a holding and is an exemption
greater than the Constitution which limits it. This
court again, in 177 P.214, Odd Fellows Building Asso·
ciation vs. Naylor, where again it discussed our Con·
stitution, Article 13, Section 3, held that where a build·
ing owned by a charitable association was, in part,
rented out to stores, the incmne being used only to keep
the building in repair and the remainder income for
charitable and benevolent purposes, the part of the
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building rented out to the stores was not exempt from
taxation under Constitution Article 13, Section 3. Yet
again, this new provision of the statute would defy it
und allow that organization to do indirectly what it
could not do directly by previous interpretations by this
.court. Let us take one more example. Suppose that
either of the three organizations should buy from the
State Land Board on a 20 year contract, some very
xaluable farm land that had been foreclosed by the State
:or Utah, and proceed to farm the land and use the pro'ceecis for its benefit. Now, I have this question: Is the
I
'equity
of the purchaser of this land taxable under 59l
..
2·21 Is its value taxable under 59-13-73, or is it exempt
·lJnder 59-13-73 ~ At the end of the contractual period
~~d when this land is paid for and title is transferred,
'sit taxable 1 In the latter case I believe we would have
':o say yes, so long as Parker et al vs. Quinn and Odd
Fellows Building Association vs. Naylor, supra, were
\till the law. Then the further question, if there is any
',!Xemption at all, is the act discriminatory in that it does
·aot treat the United States and the parties with whom
t deals, on equal basis?
I

POINT IV
, THERE IS A DISCRI~IINATION IN AP·,LICATON OF 59-13-73 U.C.A. 1953, ON ITS
'ACE, BECAUSE THE UNITED STATES
.~D THOSE 'VITH WHOM IT DEALS IS
::TOT TREATED EQUALLY WITH OTHER
39
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ENTITIES, AND 59-13-73 U.C.A. 1953, DOES
NOT REPEAL 59-2-2 U.C.A. 1953, AND SAID
SECTION IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE
FORMER.
When the court rendered its opinion (Rec. 196)
it said:
" ... the court has been deeply impressed with
the fact that the so-called Detroit and the Mus. kegon cases from Michigan had with them in
the record which went to Washington a privilege
tax which had an exception in it. It's true that
the people who apparently lifted that statute
from Michigan and brought it out here and intro·
duced it into our Legislature added some more
wrinkles in it. They have put something about
charitable use or where the proceeds of the use
would be for charity, so that out here in Utah
the Michigan statute, which was before the high·
est court in the land in those two cases, has an
additional exception. That is the exception for
charitable uses or where the proceeds are to be
used for charitable purposes."
The court further said (Rec. 198) as follows:
" ... Charities and religions were known to
this country from the time of its inception. Ch~ri·
ties and religions were Ln existence at the ti!Ue
of the Civil 'Var and this court's understandmg
of the hornbook principles of law do not dictate
that because an eleemosynary corporation such
as operates these so-called church farms is not
taxed, or because religious edifices are not tax~d,
or because other charitable organizations whicp
operate as true charities are not taxed, tha~ IS
not persuasive to this court -and I apprec1att

i
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this is merely the court of first instance-that the
act is unconstitutional . . . "
It appears to the writer that the judge missed the
point, which is, that the Legislature cannot give or make
greater exemptions than that allowed by the Constitution of the State of Utah. The Constitution as pointed
out under Points II and III, limits the exemptions.
lt is not a question of someone's individual feeling
that as a matter of principle they ought to be exempt
: (~In lad Second Ward of the Church of Jesus Christ of
:Latter-day Saints vs. State Tax Commission, 269 P2d
.1077), as expressed by that court, but is a question of
:what the limitations on exemption is. Our Legislature
enacted into the statute exemptions which are in excess
of the Constitution and contrary to cases that have been
adjudicated by this court, more particularly set out in
Points II and III. ~Ir. Boyce argues in his brief, page
36, that the Phillips Chemical Company vs. Dumas
School District, 361 U.S. 376, provided a different tax
rate on lessees of state land from those of the Federal
:;overnment. As I read the case, they did not provide
1 different tax rate, but provided a different method
lf arriving at the value of the property before
he tax was applied. Article 7173 provided that the
axable leasehold would be the price it would bring at
1 fair Yoluntary sale for cash, while Article 5248 pro'ided for the full value. Article 7173 imposed no tax
\-here the lease is for a term of less than three years,
.pplying this to our statutes. Section 59-13-74 proides that the values would be the same as if the pos1
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sessor or user was , the owner thereof as determined
in the ad valorem assessment, while our Section 59·2·2
provides that the values would be only the equity of
the purchaser. By analogy the same state of facts took
place in Phillips Chemical Company vs. Dumas School
District, 361 U.S. 376. They had two different values
to apply the tax rate to, as we have in our instance,
that is, that leases of individuals with the State of Utah
were and are and have been taxed on just the equity.
while leases of Government property, since the advent
of 59-13-73 are taxed at the same ad valorem value as
other property.

,

We feel that the trial judge erred when he found
that 59-2-2 had been impliedly repealed by Section
59-13-73, to the degree that the latter statute was in·
consistent with the for~mer. In 3 Sutherland Statutory
Construction, 3rd Edition, Section 6709, we find:
"One of the most significant aids of construe·
tion in determining the meaning of revenue laws
is the administrative interpretation given such
acts by the agency that is responsible for its ad·
ministration and enforcement."
The Utah Suupreme Court, E. C. Olsen Company vs.
State Tax Commission, 109 Utah 563, 168 P2d 324,said
on page 332, left-hand column:
" . . . a practical construction of the s~atu~
shown to haYe been the accepted construction o.
the agency charged with administering the mat
ters in question under the statute will be one f~c
tor which the court may take into consideratior
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as persuasive as to the mea~ing of the statut.e.
J4:specially is this true where the ~gency, as In
this ca~e. is one on whom the Legislature must
relr to advise it as to the practical working out
of the statute and where practical application of
the statute presents the agency with unique opportunities and experiences for discovering deficiencies, inaccuracies or improvements in the
statute . . . . "
~ow,

compare that with what is happening in this
particular situation. The State Land Board certifies
the list of all state contracts to the Tax Commission.
fhe Tax Comtnission certifies them to the assessors so
hat the assessors can assess the property under Section
59·2·2. The assessors of every county, according to our
1tipulation throughout the State of Utah, assessed the
>roperty being sold on contract by the State Land
1
Jnnrd in the same manner in 1961 as it had in all pre·ious years. The individuals in the Tax Commission
vho I have quoted so freely in my statement of facts,
~lr. Kerr and ~Ir. Rackham, who, with other employees,
$ere searching for property that might be escaping
faxntion, never once considered that Section 59-2-2
ad been repealed or had even been affected by the
nactment of Section 59-13-73. The only time such a
nought ever came up was in the course of the trial
~hen someone suggested that maybe a person could be
Jbject to two assessments, one under 59-2-2 and
,ther for the balance under ·59-13-73. From then on
'
'
,·e hear lots of arguments that Section 59-13-73 had
·npliedly repealed 59-2-2 to the degree that 59-2-2
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was inconsistent with the former. The defendant, j~
his brief, contends that not all purchasers who might
buy lands from the State of Utah would be subject
to a tax under 59-13-73. That you have to find out
first whether the possessor or purchaser was using or
possessing the lands in conjunction with the business
conducted for profit. He even argues that if a party
should buy from the State of Utah on contract, a piece
of land, and just let the land sit idle, that nothing but
his equity should be assessed under 59-2-2, while
if another person bought a piece of land of equal s~e
and dimension from the state on contract and had any
benefit regardless as to how great or how small, that
the party should then be assessed under 59-13-73. All
I can say is, what a confusing law, or interpretation
of a set of laws this can turn out to be. I do not believe
for one minute that any person would buy a piece of
land unless he believes there is a profit in the venture.
If he allows it to remain idle, he believes he will benefit
by appreciation in value more than he would benefit
from the interest he would make on the investment
if he left it in a banking account or invested it in other
properties. I do not believe for one minute that the
Legislature ever considered such a wild interpretation.
I do believe that when they passed Section 59-13·73
they never gave a second thought to Section 59·2·2.
The Legislature was after revenue from people dealing
with the Federal Government's property and were not
concerned at all with the people dealing with the State
of Utah on contract. This theory of Section 59-13·73
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mpliedly repealing any part of 59-2-2 which might
·,Je inconsistent with it, is now being widely proclaimed
,y people who were the advisors of the Tax Commisaion and the Tax Con1mission was also the advisor of
he numberous County Assessors, who, until the law
1
vus qm'stioncd, went along and administered Section
i9-:!-:! in the same manner as it had always been ad'ninistered since statehood.
The writer will agree with the statement of counsel
,or the defendant that it may be generally conceded
hat repeal by implication is not favored. Sutherland,
)tatutorY Construction, 3rd Ed., Section 2014, where
.~ is quoted:
"The presun1ption against implied repeal is
overcome, however, hy showing thatthe two acts
are irreconcilable, clearlr repugnant as to vital
matters to which they relate and so inconsistent
that the two cannot have concurrent operation."
'hese two sections are irreconcilable. Section 59-13-73
roYides that the tax under this section applies to:
" ... real or personal property which, for any
reason, is c,rcmpt from taxation., when such property is used in connection was a business condu~ted for profit.... " (Emphasis added).
and sold under contract by the State of Utah was
>t exempt from taxation because ever since statehood
tere have been provisions of the statutes, which have
quired the equity of the purchaser to be assessed
1d statutes were enacted, which are numerous, being
·~tion 5g-2-2. Section 59-2-3, Section 59-5-50 and
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59-5-51, which provide ways and means to carry out

the mandate of the legislative body. When Section
59-13-73 was passed in 1959, the Legislature, by the
very wording of the statute, intended to cover land that
was tax exempt, not land that was then being taxed.
As a consequence we had two statutes on the books,
one which was very favorable to purchasers who were
purchasing land from the State of Utah and one which
was more burdensome by comparison to individuals
who were leasing land from the Federal Government.
These two sections are just like the two sections referred
to in the Phillips Chemical Company vs. Dumas School
District, 361 U.S. 376, both in existence and both being
administered, but the burden is unequal. The defendant
argues on page 45 of his brief that Section 59-13·77
U.C.A. 1953, which contains the following provision:
"Nothing contained herewith shall be con·
strued as limiting or repealing the exemptions
granted in sections 59-2-4, 59-2-5, 59-2-6, 59·2·7,
59-2-8, 59-2-9, 59-2-12 and 59-2-13 Utah Code
Annotated, 1953."
would demonstrate a legislative intent that the pro·
visions of the privilege tax act would limit or repeal
the exemptions of Section 59-2-2 Utah Code Annotated,
1953, to the degree of any inconsistency. Let us just
review what those exemptions in these sections cover:
Section 59-2-4 covers property in interstate. commerce;~
Section 59-2-5 covers property owned by disabled vet·
erans or their unmarried widows or minor orphans;
Section 59-2-6 is application, proof and percentage
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(lisubility, minimum allowed and has reference back
59-~-5; Section 59-t-7 covers pumping plant for
rigation; Section 59-2-8 is computation of power used
,r irrigation; Section 59-2-9 is exemption to be pro&ted and paid to users and has reference back to 59·K; Srd:ion 59-2-lt has reference to exemption of
loperty owned by blind persons or their unmarried
idows or minor orphans, Amount; Section 59-2-13
rocedure and conditions, filing of application and
atcment as to vision, maximum corrected vision al',wed, and has reference back to Section 59-2-12. Each
;e of these sections is a specific exemption, that is
'rotected and has nothing to do with a statement of
\"xying a tax but is a statement of relieving a tax by
t'orm of exemption. Section 59-2-2 is the imposition
· a tax and it is followed by 59-2-3 for a method of
ltforcing the collection of that tax levy. To this writer
would appear that the legislative intention was to
~otect the exemptions only, but the statute that im'sed the tax, to-wit: 59-2-2 was intended to remain
existence and had they wanted it repealed, they could
L¥e added a section so declaring the repeal of Section
·•-2-:2. which has nothing to· do with exemptions.

POINT V
THE TRIAL COLTRT DID NOT ERR IN
IXDIXG THAT THERE HAD BEEN SUCH
DISCRI)IIXATOR1"'" APPLICATION OF
1-la-;a t'"TAH CODE AXXOTATED, 1953, AS
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TO A 'rOID THE ASSESSMENT AND TAX
AND THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN THl
RELIEF IT GRANTED.
The entire brief, in practically every point tha:
has been raised,_ has gone into the problem of discrimi·
natory application, so that the writer will not burde~
this court further by repeating, but alleges that thf
first part of this point has been fully covered. In regard
to the second part, the defendant in his argument
alleges that the State court, or even this court, if it
found that discrimination in the application of the tax
existed, and if he could convince you that it was not
statutory discrimination, then it would be your duty
to direct only part of the tax money be restored and
not all of it. Let's just take this argument and tear
it apart and see just what he is saying. If I understand
him correctly, he is saying that the only discrimination
that can exist is between the amount of tax that some
people might be required to pay under 59-2-2 when
their equity is assessed as compared with Thiokol's
tax when the full value is assessed. The formula for each
is as follows: Equity times 407o times tax rate for those
under 59-2-2 and for Thiokol it is value times 40%
times tax rate and he is, in fact, saying that you should
apply this for1nula of 59-2-2 to Thiokol and refund
only the difference between the amount so determined
from the formula and the amount that we paid. Let us
carry it a little further. Does Thiokol have any equity
in the personal property belonging to the United States
and used by it on this project? It does not. So the
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·luity of Thiokol would equal zero and zero times
·~0 times the tax rate would still be zero. It is absotely absurd. I would also like to ask this question:
tns this court, or the District Court, the power to levy
.ad determine taxes or has that power by the State
~gislature been delegated to certain designated taxI officials 1 The Supreme Court of the United States
;.. spoken on this subject and inasmuch as the dendant. through his counsel, has cited this case in his
·itf, I would assume he is fully familiar with its subject
attcr. The case is Moses Lake Homes vs. Grant
lunty, 365 U.S. 744 (1961), which is the final word.
here the lower court attempted to do exactly what
,e defendant is urging this court to do, that is, not
invalidate the entire tax but only reduce it to what
r
·would have been if plaintiff had been placed in the
me position as people purchasing from the State, and
e court said, page 751:
" ... We held in the Dumas case, supra, that
a discriminatory tax is void and 'may not be
exacted.' 361 U.S. at 387. The effect of court's
remand was to direct the District Court to decree
a valid tax for the invalid one which the State
had attempted to exact. The District .Court has
no power so to decree. Federal courts may not
assess or levy taxes. Only the appropriate taxing officials of Grant County may assess and
levy taxes on these leaseholds, and the federal
courts may··determine, within their jurisdiction,
only whether the tax levied by those officials is
or is not a valid one. When, as here, the tax is
invalid, it 'may not be exacted.' Phillips Co. vs.
Dumas School District, 361 U.S. at 387."
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The Supreme Court, having held that the theory ad
vanced by the defendant in his final argument cannol
be carried out, we will not treat the subject further

CONCLUSION
The trial court, we believe, was correct when it said:
"Now the court is just simply impelled into
the conclusion that so long as the state is going
to continue to practice such discrimination, the
least this court can do is to raise its voice in pro·
test and decide in favor of the plaintiff and find
that the tax has been discriminatorily applied.
"Three. The court finds and determines that
this statute, this privilege tax, construed together
with 59-2-2, has been applied and enforced by
the tax people during 1961 in an unequal and
dis crimina tory manner to such an extent as to
nullify the assessment and the tax involved in
this action." (Rec. 200, 201).
We believe the court erred when it found that the
privilege tax is amendatory to Section 59-2-2 and is
constitutional, notwithstanding the exceptions for re·
ligious and charitable purposes. We believe that those
exemptions and exceptions are contrary to our consti·
tution and in and of themselves would make Section
59-13-73 unconstitutional. We further believe that
Section 59-2-2 has not been amended; that Section
59-13-73 when compared with Section 59-2-2 creates
statutory discrimination which makes Section 59-13·73
unconstitutional.
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Consequently. we respectfully request this court to
n1stain that part of the judgment which declared that
:he tax had been discritninatorily applied and that the
inme was void and of no effect and to declare, by its
)pinion. that Section 59-13-73 is unconstitutional and
s in conflict with Section 59-2-2, which has not been
·epealed by implication or otherwise.
Respectfully submitted
'Valter G. Mann
Attorney for Respondent and
Cross-Appellant
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